AS215899 joins MANRS
2026-08-17
AS215899, a personal IPv6 network operated by Justas Gudynas in Lithuania, is now a MANRS participant.
I run AS215899 as a learning lab for BGP, RPKI, and routing security. Getting MANRS-ready was a natural extension of what I was already doing: filtering, signing ROAs, and keeping IRR in sync.
What we implemented
| MANRS action | How we do it |
|---|---|
| Filtering | Strict prefix + AS-path filters on all customer imports; only our own and authorized customer prefixes exported |
| Anti-spoofing | uRPF on customer-facing interfaces |
| Coordination | NOC reachable at [email protected], up-to-date PeeringDB |
| Global validation | All announced prefixes covered by RPKI ROA; RPKI-invalid routes rejected on import |
Why it matters for a small operator
MANRS is often associated with large ISPs, but small and hobbyist networks benefit just as much. A single misconfigured announcement from any AS can cause a route leak or hijack. By following MANRS norms — even on a non-commercial network — we contribute to a cleaner global routing table and set an example that routing security is accessible to everyone.
Links
- MANRS participant profile
- Our routing policy — the canonical URL we submitted to MANRS
- Network topology — real-time view from our bgproutes.io vantage point
- PeeringDB AS215899
- IRR explorer
If you operate an ASN — big or small — consider joining MANRS. The process is straightforward, and the Internet is safer when more networks participate.